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Dean: Dean: Going, Going, Almost Gone:

Going, Going, Almost Gone: The Loss of
Employees' Rights to Bring Statutory

Discrimination Claims in Court.
Pattersonv. Tenet Healthcare,Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION

With the rise in employment related litigation in recent years, arbitration of
employment discrimination claims has become increasingly important.2 In
Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.,3 the United States Supreme Court held that
an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement did not bar an
employee from separately pursuing a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 in court.4 In 1988, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this
view in Swenson v. Management RecruitersInternationalInc.5 Then, in 1991,

the Supreme Court looked at the issue in an individual employment context. In
Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,6 the Court held that a statutory claim,

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), was subject to
precluded an
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). This holding
7
individual from bringing a separate claim in a judicial forum.
In Pattersonv. Tenet Healthcare,Inc., the Eighth Circuit addressed the

issue of Gilmer's application to Title VII.8 In a case of first impression as to the
interpretation of Section 1 of the FAA (Section 1),9 the court extended the
Supreme Court's ruling and followed the majority of circuits in holding that an
employee's Title VII and state employment discrimination claims were subject
to enforceable mandatory arbitration.'0

1. 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997).
2. See Evan J. Spelfogel, Legal and PracticalImplicationsofADR andArbitration
in Employment Disputes, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 247, 248 (1993), for a discussion of the
recent increase in employment related litigation.
3. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
4. Id. at 49.
5. 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988).

6. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
7. Id. at 26.
8. 113 F.3d 832, 832 (8th Cir. 1997).

9. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) provides in relevant part: "[N]othing herein shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
10. Patterson, 113 F.3d at 837.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Debra Patterson began employment with Columbia Regional Hospital in
1989 as a medical technologist." Columbia Regional is owned and operated by
Tenet Healthcare, Inc.' 2 On March 5, 1993, Patterson signed an arbitration
agreement which was on the last page of the employee handbook she received
from Tenet. 3 However, page three of the handbook contained a statement that
4
the handbook was not intended to be a legal contract.'

11. Id. at 833.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 834-35. Page thirty-one of the handbook contained the following
language:
IMPORTANT!
Acknowledgment Form
Upon receipt, please sign and present the acknowledgment form of this handbook
to the Human Resources Department.
No written agreement concerning employment terms or conditions is valid unless
signed by a facility executive director, and senior officer of AMI, and no written
statement or agreement in this handbook concerning employment is binding, since
provisions are subject to change, and as all AMI employees are employed on an "at
will" basis .... The company reserves the right to amend, supplement, or rescind
any provisions of this handbook as it deems appropriate in its sole and absolute
discretion.
I understand AMI makes available arbitration for resolution of grievances. I also
understand that as a condition of employment and continued employment, I agree
to submit any complaints to the published process and agree to abide by and accept
the final decision of the arbitration panel as ultimate resolution of my complaints(s)
for any and all events that arise out of employment or termination of employment.
14. Id. at 834. Page three of the handbook provided as follows:
[This handbook] is not intended to constitute a legal contract with any employee or
group of employees because that can only occur with a written agreement executed
by a facility Executive Director and an AMI Senior Executive Officer. As regards
the Fair Treatment Procedure, AMI is committed to accepting the obligation to
support and assure access to binding arbitration procedure for solving disputes, if
necessary. Situations may arise from time to time which, in the Company's
judgment require procedures or actions different than those described in this
document or other written policies. Since the Company maintains the sole and
exclusive discretion to exercise the customary functions of the management in all
areas of employment and the Company operations, the judgment of management
shall be controlling in all such situations. Employees have access to a grievance
procedure described in this document that affords the opportunity to have any
employment related disputes submitted to binding arbitration.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/6
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On July 26, 1993 and January 18, 1994, Patterson filed charges with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Missouri
Commission on Human Rights (MCHR) based on treatment Patterson received
which she believed was "discriminatory and retaliatory."' 5 "On December 8,
1994, Patterson filed a grievance through Tenet's internal grievance apparatus,
the 'Fair Treatment Procedure.""' The Fair Treatment Committee investigated
and discussed Patterson's grievance at a hearing. 7 However, Tenet terminated
Patterson nine days before the hearing, at which time the grievance was
amended to include the termination. 8 The Fair Treatment Committee later
denied her grievance. 9
Patterson did not submit her claim to binding arbitration-the final step of
the Fair Treatment Procedure.20 Instead, she filed suit in district court, alleging
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)2' and the
Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA).22 The district court held that the
arbitration clause, set out on page thirty-one of the handbook and signed by
Patterson, created a binding contract to arbitrate.23 The district court also held
that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governed her claims and that the claims
were arbitrable.24 The district court then dismissed Patterson's complaint.
Patterson appealed, claiming that "she did not agree to arbitrate and that the
FAA [did] not govern her claims. '26 In support of her argument, she pointed to
the statements that "[the handbook] is not intended to constitute a legal contract"
and that "no written statement or agreement in this handbook concerning
employment is binding," from pages three and thirty-one of the handbook,
respectively.2 7 Additionally, she argued that the legislative history of the FAA
indicated that Congress intended to exclude all employment contracts from its
scope.28

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the arbitration clause was separate
and apart from the employee handbook and thus, constituted an enforceable

15. Id. at 834.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994).
22. Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc. 113 F.3d 832, 834 (8th Cir. 1997). The
Missouri Human Rights Act is codified at Mo. REv. STAT. § 213.010-213.137 (1994 &
Supp. 1997).
23. Patterson, 113 F.3d at 834.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 834-35.

28. Id. at 836.
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contract; that Section 1 of the FAA should be read narrowly, excluding from the
scope of the FAA only those classes of employees "engaged directly in the
movement of interstate commerce;" and that an employee's statutory
discrimination claims under Title VII and the MHRA were subject to arbitration,
enforceable pursuant to the FAA.29
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. ContractualEnforceabilityofArbitration ClausesIn Employee
Handbooks
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 30 was originally enacted in 1925 and
later reenacted in 1947 as Title 9 of the United States Code.31 The purpose of
the act was to "reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been adopted by
American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts."32
Section 2 of the FAA states that "[a] written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle
by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction
...
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 33 However, Section 1 of
the FAA includes an exception which exempts certain employment contracts
from its scope.34
The Eighth Circuit has held that under the FAA, "ordinary contract
principles govern whether parties have agreed to arbitrate,, 35 principles which,
in this case, come from Missouri law. 6 In Missouri, the traditional required
elements of a valid contract are an offer, acceptance, and bargained-for
consideration.37

29. Id. at 832.
30. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994).
31. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
32. Id. (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,219-20 (1985)).
33. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
34. See supranote 9.
35. Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 834 (8th Cir. 1997); see
Daisy Mfg. Co., Inc., v. NCR Corp., 29 F.3d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 1994).
36. Patterson, 113 F.3d at 834; see also First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938,
943-45 (1995).
37. Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661, 662 (Mo. 1988) (citing
Thacker v. Massman Constr. Co., 247 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Mo. 1952)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/6
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In Johnson v. McDonnellDouglas Corp.,38 an employee brought a wrongful
discharge action against her employer.39 The Missouri Supreme Court found
that Johnson's employee handbook was not an enforceable contract. The court
stated that "McDonnell's unilateral act of publishing its handbook was not a
contractual offer to its employees. The handbook was merely an informational
statement of McDonnell's self-imposed policies, providing a nonexclusive list
of acts for which an employee might be subject to discipline. ' 40 Absent a valid
contract,41 the employer could discharge the employee "for cause or without
cause."

While McDonnell Douglas held that an employee handbook did not
constitute an enforceable contract42 because it lacked the traditional elements of
a valid contract, other jurisdictions, interpreting state law, have gone both ways
on this issue, often depending on the factual circumstances.43
Once the threshold issue of whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate
is settled, the next issue is the enforceability of this agreement. The FAA
governs enforceability, but the key question is what types of agreements are
subject to arbitration under the FAA.
B. Scope of the FAA in the Context ofEmployment Contracts
A number of courts have addressed the issue of how broadly to construe
the exemption in Section 1 of the FAA. The general consensus is to construe it
narrowly, applying the exclusion only to contracts for employment of workers
involved directly in the movement of interstate commerce. 4

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988).
Id. at 661.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 662.
See Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1131 (7th Cir.

1997) (holding contract terms can be incorporated into employee handbook); Nelson v.

Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating unilateral
promulgation by an employer of arbitration provisions in an employee handbook does not
constitute a "knowing agreement"); Norton v. Caremark, Inc., 20 F.3d 330, 334 (8th Cir.
1994) (stating employee handbook and guidelines can be part of employment contract
under Minnesota law). But see Hoffman v. Aaron Kahmi, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 640, 644
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding handbook did not supercede plaintiff's original employment
contract); Phipps v. IASD Health Servs. Corp., 558 N.W. 2d 198, 204 (Iowa 1997)
(finding handbook did not constitute enforceable contract).
44. See Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding Section I exempts only contracts of employment of workers engaged in the
movement ofgoods in interstate commerce); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d

592, 600-01 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding Section 1 "should be narrowly construed to apply
to employment contracts of seamen, railroad workers, and any other class of workers

actually engaged in the movement of goods in interstate commerce"); Miller Brewing Co.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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The United States Supreme Court, in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v.
Dobson,45 dealt directly with the construction of Section 2 of the FAA. The
Court began by looking at the language of Section 2, specifically at the words
"involving commerce." The Court interpreted these words in a broader sense
than the words "in commerce."46 The Court found that a broad interpretation
was consistent with the FAA's basic purpose to put arbitration agreements on the
"same footing" as other contracts. The Court determined that broad construction
allows the FAA to cover contracts in a broad array of contexts.47
While Allied-Bruce did not speak to the differences in construction between
Section 2 and Section 1 of the FAA, the District of Columbia Circuit, in Cole v.
Burns InternationalSecurity Services,48 did address how broadly the language
in Section 1 should be interpreted. 49 The appellant in Cole argued that Section
1 exempted all contracts of employment, consistent with a broad reading of the
language in Section 2.50 However, the court held that Section 1 "does not
exclude all contracts of employment that affect commerce.' Instead, it agreed
with the circuits that hold that "section 1 of the FAA exempts only those
employment contracts of workers actually engaged in the movement of goods
in interstate commerce., 52 The court's rationale for the narrow reading of
Section 1 came from two "well-established canons of statutory construction." 3

v. Brewery Workers Local Union No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
Section 1applies only "to workers employed in the transportation industries"); Erving v.
Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding Section
1 applies "only to those actually in the transportation industry"); Dickstein v. duPont, 443
F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 197 1) (holding Section 1 is limited to employees "involved in, or
closely related to, the actual movement of goods in interstate commerce"); Tenney Eng'g,
Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir.
1953) (holding Section 1 applies only to workers "who are actually engaged in the
movement of interstate or foreign commerce or in work so closely related thereto as to
be in practical effect part of it"); see also Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d
222, 227 (3d Cir. 1997) (reaffirming the holding in Tenney Engineering). But see United
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir.
1954) (questioning the narrow interpretation of Section 1).
45. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 273.
Id. at 275 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974).
105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1470-72.

50. Id. at 1470.

51. Id. at 1470.
52. Id. at 1471. See supra note 44.
53. Id. at 1470. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, ch. 8, § 1 (2d Ed. 1995) (discussing canons of
statutory interpretation).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/6
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First, the court in Cole observed that courts should "avoid a reading [of
statutory language] which renders some words altogether redundant. 5 4 It noted
that if the final exclusionary clause of Section 1 applied to all workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce, there would be no need to specifically exclude
seamen and railroad workers." Instead, a broad exclusion could have stated,
"nothing herein shall apply to contracts of employment. 56
The second canon of statutory construction which the court utilized,
ejusdem generis, "limits general terms which follow specific ones to matters
similar to those specified."57 In this case, the court found that the general phrase,
"any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce," derived
its meaning from the more specific terms, "seamen" and "railroad employees."
Thus, the exclusion includes only those classes of workers who are similarly
engaged in the direct movement of interstate commerce.5 8 Additionally, the
court noted that the narrow interpretation of the Section 1 exclusionary clause
was consistent with the Allied-Bruce interpretation of the FAA; the words
"involving commerce" in Section 2 were broader than the words "in commerce"
in Section 1.59
In addition to the District of Columbia Circuit, the First, Second, Third,
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have all held that the exclusion in Section 1
should be narrowly construed. 60 The Ninth Circuit characterized the question as
unresolved 6' and the Fourth Circuit questioned the narrow interpretation.6 2
Construing Section 1 narrowly allows the FAA to cover a broad range of
employment situations. 63 However, a question remains as to which statutory
claims must be arbitrated, given a valid arbitration clause in an employment
contract governed by the FAA.
C. Arbitration of Statutory DiscriminationClaims
In 1974, in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.,64 the United States Supreme
Court held that an employee's submission of a claim to final arbitration under
the nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining agreement did not
54. Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995)).
55. Id. See Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996).
56. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1470-71.
57. Id. at 1471 (quoting Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1471-72.
60. See supranote 44.
61. See Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1992).
62. See United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215
F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954).
63. See infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
64. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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foreclose that employee's statutory right to a trial under the equal employment
opportunity provisions of the Civil Rights Act.6 5 In reaching this holding, the
Court stated that the purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII) 66 was "to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those
practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. 67 The Court also stated that the federal courts maintained
final responsibility for enforcement of Title VI. 68 Additionally, the Court found
that the legislative history of Title VII indicated that Congress intended to allow
individuals to independently pursue their rights under Title VII as well as other
state and federal statutes.6 9 Title VII "was designed to supplement rather than
supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination."7
The Court rejected the lower courts' reasoning that allowing an employee's
claims to be considered in both arbitral and judicial forums put "two strings to
[the employee's] bow" while giving the employer only one.7' When an
employee submits a grievance to arbitration, the employee seeks to resolve a
"contractual right under the collective bargaining agreement. 72 However, in
filing a Title VII lawsuit, the employee is asserting an independent statutory
right given to the employee by Congress. 73 The separate nature of these rights
is not changed by the fact that they arose out of the same facts, and there
is no
74
inconsistency in allowing each to be enforced in its respective forum.
For almost twenty years after Gardner-Denver, courts interpreted its
holding to allow employees with valid arbitration agreements to bring
independent statutory discrimination claims against their employers in court, in
both the collective bargaining and individual employment contexts.
In Barrantinev. Arkansas-Best FreightSystem, Inc.,75 the Supreme Court
upheld its decision in Gardner-Denverand allowed a group of employees to

bring an action in federal court alleging a violation of the minimum wage
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 76 The employees previously and

65. Id. at 49.
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 (1994).

67. Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 44 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 48. In a footnote, the Court quoted a statement by one of the sponsors of
Title VII and cited a Senate report indicating intent that Title VII not affect rights which
exist under any other laws. Id. at 49 n.9.
70. Id. at 48-49.
71. Id. at 54.
72. Id. at 49.
73. Id. at 49-50.
74. Id. at 50.

75. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
76. Id. at 745-46.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/6
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unsuccessfully submitted their claim to ajoint grievance committee pursuant to
the provisions of their collective bargaining agreement.77
In McDonald v. City of West Branch,7 8 the Supreme Court again followed
Gardner-Denverand allowed a police officer to institute a federal civil rights
action after having already pursued the claim in an arbitral forum pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement.79
In Swenson v. Management Recruiters International,Inc.,8" the Eighth
Circuit followed Gardner-Denver,holding that an employee's discrimination
claims against her employer under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights
Act were not subject to compulsory arbitration.8 The court pointed out that
cases where the FAA preempted state and federal remedies did not involve
employment discrimination claims.8 2 Additionally, the court expressed its view
that the fact that Gardner-Denverinvolved a collective bargaining agreement
was not a dispositive factor in the decision. Instead, the holding turned upon

77. Id.
78. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
79. Id. at 288-89.
80. 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988).
81. Id. at 1307-09. See also Wilmington v. J.J. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909 (8th Cir.
1986) (holding that arbitral award did not foreclose employee's rights under Section 1981
of the Civil Rights Act). Other circuits followed Gardner-Denverin similar cases. See,
e.g., Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 185-86 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that
an employee was not required to pursue arbitration before a judicial hearing on her civil
rights claim even though she signed an agreement to arbitrate disputes with her
employer); Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that an
arbitration clause in a former employee's contract was inconsistent with the statutory
scheme for enforcement of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Darden v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that while an arbitrator's
decision in a Title VII case could be accorded "great weight," final authority rested with
the judiciary).
82. Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1306 n.5 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987)
(holding that claim for wages under the California Labor Code must be arbitrated, despite
California statute which invalidated arbitration agreements in wage collection cases);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding that claims
under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and RICO claims were arbitrable
under predispute arbitration agreements); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that federal anti-trust claims must be
arbitrated under an arbitration agreement involving international transaction); Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (rejecting the "intertwining" doctrine
in holding that state law claims, pendent to non-arbitrable federal securities claims, must
be arbitrated); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that claims
asserted under California Franchise Investment Law were arbitrable, despite California
law invalidating arbitration clause)).
83. Swenson, 858 F.2d at 1306.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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"the unique nature of Title VII" and the fact that "'Congress indicated that it
considered the policy against discrimination to be of the highest priority."' 84
As many of these post-Gardner-Denvercases were being decided, the
United States Supreme Court also began a line of three cases which have
become known as the Mitsubishi Trilogy. In the first of these, Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 85 a dispute arose between a
Japanese auto-maker and a distributorship in Puerto Rico. 6 The auto-maker
sought to compel arbitration under the FAA and the distributor counterclaimed,
alleging violations of the Sherman Act.87 The Supreme Court held that because
the arbitration clause in the parties' contract encompassed statutory claims, the
antitrust dispute was subject to arbitration under the Arbitration Act. 88
In the second case, Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,89 the
Supreme Court extended the holding in Mitsubishi to allow arbitration of claims
arising under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)"
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.9 The Court stated that the burden was
on the party opposing arbitration of the statutory claim to demonstrate
Congressional intent to exempt a claim from the scope of the FAA. 92
In the final case of the trilogy, Rodriguez de Quuas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc.,93 the Court held that an agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim
under the Securities Exchange Act of 193314 was enforceable. In so holding, the
Court overruled Wilko v. Swan,95 a case on which Gardner-Denverrelied to
some extent. However,
the Court did not mention the direct effect of its decision
96
on Gardner-Denver.
The Mitsubishi Trilogy provided a new foundation for the Supreme Court's
evolving view on the role of arbitration in the employment context. These cases
established that statutory claims were arbitrable. The next step was to allow
arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims.
The United States Supreme Court took this step in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.97 Gilmer held that a claim by a registered
securities representative against his employer for violation of the Age

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974)).
473 U.S. 614 (1985).
Id. at 616-17.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-36 (1994).

88. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

482 U.S. 220 (1987).
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994).
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
490 U.S. 477 (1989).
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
346 U.S. 427 (1953).

Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 485.
500 U.S. 20 (1991).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/6
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Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)98 "was subject to compulsory

arbitration pursuant to [the] arbitration agreement in [his] securities registration
application."99' The Court stated that it was "by now clear that statutory claims
may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the
FAA."'00 The Court reasoned that "in agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forego his substantive rights," he merely submits them to an
arbitral forum.'0 ' Additionally, the Court cited McMahon to assert that the
burden is on the claimant to show "Congress intended to preclude waiver of a
judicial forum for ADEA claims.' 0 2 Furthermore, the Court noted that in
considering if preclusion of waiver was intended, a court should bear in mind the
"federal policy favoring arbitration."' 0 3 Even considering the purpose behind
enactment of the ADEA, the court held that the "remedial and deterrent"
functions of the statute could still be served so long as the claimant could
effectively vindicate his claims in an arbitral forum.'04 Further, the Court stated
that "inequality of bargaining power" was insufficient to hold arbitration
agreements not enforceable in the employment context. 0 5 In support, it cited
language from Section 2 of the FAA that arbitration agreements are enforceable
"save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."'"
The Gilmer court did not expressly overrule its earlier decision in Gardner07
Denver. Instead, the Court distinguished the two cases on several grounds.
First, the Court stated that Gardner-Denver "did not involve the issue of
enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims," but instead
involved the issue of "whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded
subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims."' 0' Second, the Court pointed
out that Gardner-Denveroccurred "in the context of a collective bargaining
agreement," while Gilmer dealt with an individual employment situation. 0 9

98. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
99. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
100. Id. at 26-27.

101. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
102. Id. (quoting Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,

227 (1987)).
103. Id. (quoting Moses H.Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.
1,24 (1983)).

104. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi,473 U.S. at 637).
105. Id. at 33.
106. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. §2 (1994)).
107. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.

108. Id.
109. Id.
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Last, the Court noted that Gardner-Denverwas "not decided under the FAA,"
which changed the policy towards arbitration agreements.' 0
Although Gilnerclearly stated that "statutory claims may be the subject of
an arbitration agreement," it left a few issues unresolved, including the question
of whether its holding is limited to securities licensing and the ADEA or whether
it can be extended to other statutes affecting employment.' Several courts have
since extended Gilmer's holding beyond the ADEA to1 2several other statutes,
113
including the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), the Equal Pay Act,
the Employee Polygraph Protection Act," 4 and Title VII." 5 Post-Gilmercases
have also held arbitration clauses enforceable in contexts other than securities
licensing agreements, including employment contracts,"" employee
handbooks," 7 and employment applications.' 8
In Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Containek,Inc.," 9 the Fourth Circuit

extended the Gilmer ruling into the collective bargaining arena. The court held
that an arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement was
enforceable and forced an employee to arbitrate her Title VII and ADA claims
against her employer. 20 However, several other circuits reject this view and
continue to follow Gardner-Denver with respect to collective bargaining
agreements. These courts find that employees are not precluded from bringing
statutory claims in court even though the agreement contains an arbitration

110. Id. Note that the court in Gilner did not address the scope of Section 1 of the
FAA because it was not raised on appeal. Id. at 25 n.2.
111. Id. at 26. See Donna Meredith Matthews, Note, Employment Law After
Gilmer: Compulsory Arbitration ofStatutoryAntidiscriminationRights, 18 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 347, 366-67 (1997) (pointing out five issues the author believes Gilmer
has left unresolved).
112. See Solomon v. Duke Univ., 850 F. Supp. 372 (M.D.N.C. 1993).
113. See Hurst v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 21 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 1994);
Kinnebrew v. Gulf Ins. Co., No. 3:94-CV-1517-R, 1994 WL 803508, (N.D. Tex. Nov.
28, 1994).
114. See Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877, 881-82 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 986 (1992).
115. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 882 (4th

Cir. 1996) (holding that arbitration of employee's Title VII and ADA claims was
mandatory under collective bargaining agreement); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner

& Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons,
Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (1Ith Cir. 1992); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956
F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 308

(6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229,230 (5th Cir. 1991).
116. See Maye v. Smith Barney, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Crawford
v. West Jersey Health Sys., 827 F. Supp. 1232 (D.N.J. 1994).

117. See Lang v. Burlington N. R.R., 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993).
118. See Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992).
119. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
120. Id. at 885-86.
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clause.' Additionally, the Ninth Circuit, in PrudentialIns. Co. ofAmerica v.
Lai," narrowly interpreted Gilmer and held that, in an individual employment
context, there must be a "knowing agreement to arbitrate employment disputes
before an employee may be deemed to have waived" her statutory rights
prescribed by Title VII."'
IV. INSTANT DECISION
Pattersonv. Tenet Healthcare,Inc.124 was the Eighth Circuit's first look at
the questions raised by Gilmer in the individual employment context. The court
found that the arbitration clause, which Patterson signed, was separate from the
other terms of her employee handbook and constituted an enforceable contract,
that the FAA covered the arbitration agreement at issue, that as a matter of first
impression, Section 1 of the FAA was to be given a narrow reading, exempting
only those classes of employees engaged directly in the movement of interstate
commerce, and therefore, that Patterson's Title VII25discrimination claims were
subject to enforceable arbitration under the FAA.
The court first examined whether Patterson and Tenet agreed to arbitrate
their dispute. 2 6 The court observed that "[u]nder Missouri law, employee
handbooks generally are not considered contracts, because they normally lack
the traditional prerequisites of a contract." 27 Considering the provisions in
Patterson's handbook on pages three and thirty-one, 2 1 the court concluded that
the arbitration clause on page thirty-one was separate and apart from the other
provisions of the handbook; therefore, the clause constituted an enforceable

121. See Brisentine v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 117 F.3d 519, 526-27 (1 lth
Cir. 1997) (holding that employee's ADA claim was not subject to compulsory arbitration
pursuant to arbitration clause in collective bargaining agreement); Harrison v. Eddy
Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that employee was not required to
exhaust arbitration remedies under collective bargaining agreement prior to bringing suit
under Title VII); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
union cannot consent for employee by signing collective bargaining agreement which
requires arbitration of statutory claims); Vamer v. Nat'l Super Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209
(8th Cir. 1996) (holding that employee was not required to exhaust arbitration remedies
under collective bargaining agreement prior to bringing suit under Title VII).
122. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
123. Id. at 1304. See Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756 (9th
Cir. 1997).
124. 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 834.
127. Id. at 835 (quoting Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661,
662 (Mo. 1988)).
128. See supra notes 13-14.
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contract. 29 The court pointed out that the clause was "set forth on a separate
page of the handbook and introduced by [a] heading,"' 130 that the page on which
the clause was located was removed from the handbook and stored in a file after
the employee signed it, and that there was "a marked transition in language and
tone from the paragraph preceding the arbitration clause."' 3' Furthermore,
although the handbook contained language to the effect that the company
reserved the right to modify or rescind any of the terms of the handbook, the
arbitration clause used sufficient contractual language to put the employee on
notice that the clause was
separate and distinct, and therefore, not subject to the
32
reservation of rights.1
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether the FAA govemed the
agreement to arbitrate. 133 This presented a question of first impression for the
Eighth Circuit as to whether Section 1'3 should be interpreted broadly to exempt
all employment contracts from the scope of the Act or narrowly to exempt only
those classes of employees that are engaged directly in the movement of
interstate commerce.'35 The court sided with those circuits that give Section 1
a narrow reading. 36 The court cited Cole v. Burns InternationalSecurity
Services137 and its discussion of two statutory interpretation canons which
support the narrow construction. 3 Furthermore, the court agreed with Cole that
139
the Supreme Court's decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson
supported a narrow reading of the exemption in Section 1."40 The court
disagreed with Patterson's argument that the legislative history of Section 1
revealed a congressional intent to exempt all employment contracts from the
FAA, stating that "[i]n a case such as this, where the statutory text does not
admit of serious ambiguity, and where firmly established case law is absolutely

129. Patterson,113 F.3d at 835 (citing Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. Chilean
Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1960)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See supranote 9 and accompanying text.
135. Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997).
136. See supra note 44. The court noted that only the Fourth Circuit has interpreted
Section 1 broadly. Patterson, 113 F.3d at 836; see United Elec. Radio & Machine
Workers of Amer. v. Miller Metal Prods., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954). The
Patterson court noted that the Fourth Circuit decision was "explicitly limited to the
collective bargaining context." Patterson, 113 F.3d at 836.
137. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
138. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
139. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
140. Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 836 (8th Cir. 1997); see
supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text for the Allied-Bruce court's discussion of this
issue.
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clear on the meaning of the statute, legislative history is, at best, secondary, and,
at worst, irrelevant.' 4' Thus, the court concluded that Section 1 does not exclude
agreement at issue and therefore, it is enforceable under the
the arbitration
1 42
FAA.

Finally, the court decided whether Patterson's statutory discrimination
claims were arbitrable.143 The court began by pointing to Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.'" as controlling. 4 It noted that Gilmer
distinguished its holding from Gardner-Denverin that Gardner-Denveroccurred
in the context of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), while Gilmer was
decided in an individual employment situation. 46 The Patterson court
acknowledged that, in enforcing arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement, the agreement obtained by a union represents the interest of the
majority, creating "tension between collective representation and individual
statutory rights."' 147 It also recognized that "labor arbitrators are generally only
authorized under CBAs to resolve contractual, and not statutory, claims."' 48 In
recognition of these concerns, the court noted that the Eighth Circuit, after
Gilmer, held that arbitration agreements within a CBA do not bar statutory
claims under Title VII. 49 However, the instant case involved an arbitration
agreement which represented the interests of an individual, and the arbitration
agreement at issue did not "limit the arbitrator solely to interpretation of the
contract."' 50 Therefore, the court followed the post-Gilmercases which hold that
Title VII claims are subject to arbitration agreements in the individual
employment context.' As further support, the court cited language from the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 that "the use of alternative means of dispute resolution,
141. Patterson, 113 F.3d at 836 (quoting Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d
1465, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
142. Id. at 836-37.
143. Id. at 837-38.
144. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
145. Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 837 (citing Gilner,500 U.S. at 35; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 364 (7th Cir. 1997)).

148. Id. (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34).
149. Id. (citing Varner v. National Super Mkts., Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir.
1996); Stacks v. Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 27 F.3d 1316, 1326 n.3 (8th Cir.
1994)).
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1481-82 (D.C. Cir.
1997); Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 882 (4th Cir.
1996); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487 (10th
Cir. 1994); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (11 th Cir. 1992);
Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992); Willis v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991)).
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including... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes
arising under the Acts
52
title."'
this
by
amended
law
federal
of
provisions
or
Patterson overruled the prior Eighth Circuit decision in Swenson v.
ManagementRecruitersInternational,Inc.,153 which held that an employee was
not barred from bringing an action under Title VII even though she had signed
an individual arbitration agreement. 54 The court in Swenson had been
concerned about the arbitral forum being adequate to assist the claimant and
paying "sufficient attention to the transcendent public interest in the enforcement
of Title VII.' 55 In the instant case, the court cited statements from Gilmer that
arbitration effectively vindicates an employee's statutory cause of action through56
the use of neutral arbitrators, adequate discovery, and adequate types of relief1
Furthermore, the public policy of Title VII is carried out through the suits of
employees who are not subject to arbitration 7agreements, through EEOC actions,
and through individual arbitration claims.1
Because Gilmer "effectively overruled" the Eighth Circuit's holding in
Swenson, the
court held that Patterson's Title VII claim was subject to
58
arbitration. 1
V. COMMENT
Not surprisingly, the court in Pattersonfollowed the post-Gilmer trend of
allowing arbitration of Title VII claims, and in interpreting the Section 1
exemption to apply only to those employment contracts dealing with workers
engaged directly in the movement of interstate commerce. Pattersonmay, in
fact, be a logical extension of Gilmer from ADEA claims to Title VII claims,
and several courts have supported this proposition. 59 Indeed, the court cited
Gilmer as controlling of its analysis. 60 However, the question is then whether
Gilmer stands on solid ground.

152. Id. (quoting The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105
Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991)).
153. 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1988).
154. Id. at 1306-09.
155. Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997).
156. Id. at 838 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28,
30-33 (1991)).
157. Id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31-32).
158. Id.

159. See supra note 115. But see Heidi M. Hellekson, Note, Taking the
"Alternative" Out of the Dispute Resolution of Title VII Claims: The Implications of a
MandatoryEnforcement Scheme of.ArbitrationAgreements Arising Out of Employment
Contracts,70 N.D. L. REv. 435, 453-56 (1994) (arguing the differences between Title

VII and the ADEA).
160. Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997).
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The court in Gilmer made a significant leap forward in relying on the
Mitsubishi Trilogy, which dealt with antitrust and securities violations, to reach
the conclusion that employment discrimination claims under the ADEA were
arbitrable. Whether this was a logical step is somewhat questionable, especially
given that the Gardner-Denvercollective bargaining cases present a closer
analogy to the situation in Gilmer. It appears that the only reasonable way to
reach the result in Gilmer was through the FAA and the narrow interpretation of
the exemption in Section 1.
Many courts have previously dealt with the interpretation of Section 1, and
have held the narrow view to be proper, 6' but Gilmer did not directly address
the issue. 62 The Supreme Court in Allied-Bruce addressed the question of the
interpretation of Section 2.163 Subsequent courts have utilized Allied-Bruce's
broad interpretation of that section to interpret Section 1 narrowly,'64 but there
are still some arguments that Section 1 should be interpreted broadly.
In Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,165 the Sixth Circuit stated that "all
employment contracts with employers subject to regulation under Title VII" fell
within the Section 1 exclusion, and therefore, such employment contracts were
not within the scope of the FAA. 6 6 Additionally, some argue that it is not
logical to interpret Section 1 more narrowly than Section 2 when Section 2 is
said to have the same scope as the Commerce Clause, because the result is a
paradox that those who are more involved in the
movement of interstate
67
commerce are excluded from the scope of the Act.
Another argument against the narrow interpretation of Section 1 is that the
legislative history of the FAA indicates an intent to exclude all employment
contracts from its scope. 16 The original bill was drafted by an American Bar
Association committee and was entitled, "Sales and Contracts to Sell in
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration.' ' 69 At
a hearing before a Senate committee, the Secretary of Commerce, Herbert
Hoover proposed the exclusionary language found in Section 1 to avoid the

161. See supra note 44.

162. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991).
163. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273 (1995).
164. See supra note 44.
165. 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
166. Id. at311.
167. See Brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14, Gilmer v.

Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (No. 90-18).
168. See Hellekson, supra note 159, at 446 (discussing the legislative history of
Title VII).

169. Hearing on S. 4213 and S.4214 before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 1 (1923); see also Gilner, 500 U.S. at 39 (Stevens, J.,

dissenting).
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possibility that contracts of all workers would be included in the FAA. 7 °
Furthermore, the ABA committee chairman assured Senators that the bill "[was]
not intended to be an act referring to labor disputes at all.''
In addition to questions about the interpretation of the FAA, there are also
procedural and other problems concerning arbitration of statutory employment
discrimination claims. 72 First, arbitration deprives the claimant of the judicial
forum provided by the statute. 73The court in Gilmer responded to this problem
by stating that "if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded to
include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention
will be deducible from text or legislative history."' 74 Is it not fair to say,
however, that this might not be the case? If Congress had never envisioned
arbitration of a particular statutory claim and the judicial forum was provided for
in the statute, there would be no reason to include any language explicitly
removing arbitration as a possible means of adjudication.
Next, arbitration places limits on discovery.'75 The Gilmer court responded
to this concern by pointing out that it was unlikely that an age discrimination
claim would "require more extensive discovery than other claims" which had
been found arbitrable, "such as RICO and antitrust claims.' 76 However, there
is an argument that in an employment discrimination claim, the employer is
likely to have exclusive access to the information necessary for the employee to
bring a successful action. This limited discovery can create a substantial
hardship for an employee in this position.
Another problem with enforcing arbitration agreements in the employment77
context is the unequal bargaining power between employers and employees.
Gihnerstated, in response to this problem, that "[m]ere inequality in bargaining
power ... is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never
enforceable. . . ," but then acknowledged that a claim of unequal bargaining
power is best left to determination on a case-by-case basis, thereby leaving the
door open.'78 The fact is that many employees have no meaningful choice in
agreeing to arbitration; they must accept mandatory arbitration or risk being
denied employment. 171

170. Hearing on S.4213 and S. 4214 before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 14 (1923).
171. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 39 (1991).
172. See id. at 29-33.
173. Id. at 29.
174. Id.
175. Id. at31.

176. Id.
177. Id. at 33.
178. Id.

179. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and ConsumerRights Claims in an Age of CompelledArbitration, 1997 Wis.
L. REv. 33, 132 (discussing a General Accounting Office survey regarding the number
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Gilmer conceded that all statutory claims may not be appropriate for
arbitration,' and Title VII and other discrimination claims should be taken as
good examples. The legislative history of Title VII in particular indicates an
intent to allow individuals to pursue their rights under Title VII independent of
other available remedies.' 8 ' As the court in Gardner-Denver stated, it was
designed to "supplement," not "supplant" existing laws.' 82 Furthermore, the
purpose of Title VII was to assure equality of employment opportunities by
eliminating discriminatory practices. To that end, Title VII vested federal courts
with the powers of enforcement.' 8 ' The Eighth Circuit, in Swenson v.
ManagementRecruitersInternational,Inc., went so far as to say that GardnerDenver was not decided based on the collective bargaining context, but instead
because of the unique nature of Title VII. 8 1 Patterson does not reflect a
continuation of that view.
A final point to consider is recent Congressional proposals to limit
compulsory arbitration. In 1994, the Senate introduced a bill entitled the
"Protection From Coercive Employment Agreements Act," which would amend
Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA among others.'8 5 The bill would make it
illegal to condition employment on an employee submitting to mandatory
arbitration and would have the effect of virtually eliminating such clauses from
employment contracts. 86 Also in 1994, and again in 1995, a bill was introduced
in the House and Senate called the "Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of
1994. '' 187 This bill would amend Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and the FAA
among others. 88 It would restrict arbitration of certain claims themselves, rather
than concentrating on employment contracts. 8 9
Given the arguments against requiring arbitration of statutory employment
discrimination claims like Title VII, we are still left with the fact that the United
States Supreme Court ruled such claims are arbitrable and the Eighth Circuit has
followed this decision. As mentioned at the beginning of this Note, arbitration
has become increasingly important with the increase in employment related

of employers who require submission to arbitration as a condition of employment).
180. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
181. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 44.
184. 858 F.2d 1304, 1306 (8th Cir. 1988).
185. S.2012, 103d Cong. (1994).
186. S.2012, 103d Cong. (1994).
187. H.R. 4981, 103d Cong. (1994); S.2405, 103d Cong. (1994) (introduced again
in 1995 as S.366, 104th Cong. (1995)).
188. H.R. 4981, 103d Cong.(1994); S. 2405, 103d Cong. (1994) (introduced again
in 1995 as S. 366, 104th Cong. (1995)).
189. H.R. 4981, 103d Cong.(1994); S. 2405, 103d Cong. (1994) (introduced again
in 1995 as S. 366, 104th Cong. (1995)).
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litigation. 9 However, as its importance grows for purposes of efficiency, the
question of whether it properly serves the interests of the workers of America
will surely be raised again.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare,Inc., the Eighth Circuit extended the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane
Corp. to require arbitration of Title VII claims, pursuant to a valid individual
arbitration agreement and the Federal Arbitration Act.' 9' The court established
that Section 1 of the FAA should be read narrowly, excluding from the scope of
the Act only those classes of employees "engaged directly in the movement of
interstate commerce."' 92 While the court clearly followed recent precedent, it
brushed aside many of the problems that arbitration of statutory discrimination
claims presents and ignored the legislative history of Title VII, which indicates
congressional intent to exclude all employment contracts from the scope of the
FAA. The effect of this decision is that many workers with little bargaining
power have lost a fundamental right to pursue their grievances in a court of law.
JUSTIN M. DEAN

190. See supra note 2.
191. Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 1997).
192. Id. at 835.
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